SULHU FORTNIGHT AS COURT-CONNECTED ADR IN NASARAWA STATE: A LEGAL COMMENTARY ON DESIGN, LEGITIMACY, AND RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS

Joseph M. Gbagyo, ACIArb (UK), Augusta Shahin, MCIArb (UK) and Oge-Ali Green, ACIArb (UK)

INTRODUCTION

Delay in the administration of justice remains one of the most persistent weaknesses of Nigeria’s justice system. It shows up in repeated adjournments, congested dockets, slow case progression, and the routine normalisation of “next date” as a substitute for movement. The costs are practical and immediate: litigants spend years pursuing remedies that should take months, legal expenses rise with every adjournment, and public confidence in the courts erodes. In criminal matters, the consequences are sharper. Prolonged pre-trial detention and extended remand periods raise serious liberty and fair hearing concerns, particularly where minor offences, weak case preparation, or administrative inefficiencies keep people in custody long after the law’s protections should have applied. [1] [2]

Within this context, Nasarawa State has introduced a time-bound, court-connected intervention known as the Sulhu Fortnight, convened through the Nasarawa State Multi-Door Courthouse (NMDC) under the leadership of the Honourable Chief Judge and Chairman of the NMDC Governing Council, Hon. Justice Aisha Mohammed Usman. The Sulhu Fortnight is presented as a targeted initiative to promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), particularly Sulhu, to improve access to justice, reduce court congestion, and facilitate amicable resolution of disputes. A stakeholder orientation meeting held on 30 January 2026 further indicates that the initiative is designed as a coordinated programme with defined roles and implementation modalities, rather than an informal settlement drive. [3]

This commentary examines the Sulhu Fortnight as a court-connected ADR mechanism and considers its legal significance through two linked questions. First, what gives a judiciary-supported, time-bound settlement programme legitimacy within Nigeria’s constitutional and human rights framework? Second, what safeguards must accompany any acceleration initiative so that efficiency does not become pressure, reduced due process, or weak settlement outcomes? Drawing on selected comparative examples, the article argues that the real measure of a programme like the Sulhu Fortnight is not speed alone, but whether it reduces avoidable delay while producing fair, voluntary, and enforceable outcomes consistent with the right to fair hearing and the protection of personal liberty. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]

CONTEXT: DELAY AS AN ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE AND RIGHTS CONCERN

Judicial delay is often discussed as an operational failure, but it is also a rights issue. For civil litigants, delay can operate as a de facto denial of remedy, particularly for low-income parties who cannot sustain prolonged litigation costs. For defendants, delay can translate into extended remand and pre-trial detention, with all the associated consequences for employment, family life, health, and dignity. These risks sit within Nigeria’s fair hearing and liberty framework, and the parallel protections under the African Charter. [1] [2]

Time-bound interventions must therefore be assessed through a rights-sensitive lens. The central question is whether a concentrated process reduces avoidable delay while keeping procedural fairness intact, including the right to be heard, the right to legal representation where applicable, and the integrity of judicial outcomes.

WHAT THE SULHU FORTNIGHT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

The Sulhu Fortnight is framed as a deliberate, time-bound programme to strengthen access to justice by promoting ADR, particularly Sulhu, within a court-connected setting. It is not presented as a replacement for adjudication. Rather, it is a structured attempt to increase settlement uptake for suitable matters and to reduce court congestion through coordination among justice sector actors. [3]

Two clarifications are essential for accurate legal characterisation.

First, the Sulhu Fortnight should be understood as court-connected ADR programming. It may involve screening, referrals, and settlement processes running alongside conventional adjudication.

Second, it should not be treated as proof that systemic delay has been cured. Its proper claim is narrower: it is designed to reduce avoidable delay for disputes that are suitable for settlement or accelerated progression, and to strengthen institutional coordination around those disputes.

DEFINITION: “SULHU” IN THIS COMMENTARY

In this commentary, “Sulhu” is used in the court-connected ADR sense indicated by the NMDC’s framing of the initiative, that is, a structured amicable settlement process facilitated under the Multi-Door Courthouse framework. It is treated here as a conciliation or mediation-type process aimed at resolving civil disputes by agreement, rather than adjudication.

This usage is without prejudice to community-based reconciliation practices that may use similar terminology outside the formal court system. The legal emphasis in this paper is on court-connected process design, documentation, enforceability, and safeguards.

COMPARATIVE NOTE: COURT-CONNECTED CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION MODELS

Comparative experience shows that court-connected amicable settlement sits on a spectrum. Some jurisdictions rely on detailed legislation and formal court-linked centres. Others embed settlement offices inside specialised courts. Others operate within plural justice settings where community reconciliation exists alongside courts, and the key question becomes governance of the interface between informal settlement and formal rights standards.

4.1 United Arab Emirates

The UAE provides a legislative model for mediation and conciliation in civil and commercial disputes. Its federal framework is relevant for design lessons on how judicial authorities can structure court-connected ADR through designated centres, defined procedures, and formal routes for processing and recording outcomes. [4]

4.2 Pakistan

Pakistan illustrates a statutory “court referral plus neutrals” approach, supported by an express ADR framework and an institutional concept of panels of neutrals. This comparator is useful for operational lessons, namely, defined referral powers, credible neutrals, and process discipline for documentation and reporting. [5] [6]

4.3 Egypt

Egypt’s family courts model is frequently referenced for dispute settlement offices connected to family litigation. The comparative value for Nasarawa is not the subject-matter setting, but the implementation lesson: settlement structures may exist, yet enforcement and consistent treatment of settlement outcomes can vary unless the legal effect of settlements and the enforcement route are clearly defined and consistently applied. [7] [8]

4.4 Indonesia

Indonesia is useful for the safeguards question. Scholarship discussing mediation practice in Religious Courts highlights the risks of compulsory or pressured settlement in sensitive matters and the importance of screening and exemptions, particularly where vulnerability is present. This is directly relevant to the design warning that speed and settlement incentives should not translate into coercion or compromised rights. [9]

4.5 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is relevant for the relationship between settlement and enforceability. Its ratification and implementation position under the Singapore Convention illustrates how a system can support enforceability of qualifying mediated settlements in international commercial contexts. Official accounts of conciliation infrastructure also show institutional investment in amicable settlement. The careful point for Nasarawa is that settlement-based programming gains durability when paired with clear enforceability routes and institutional support. [10] [11]

4.6 Sudan

Sudan is best used as a plural-justice comparator. Analyses of customary mediation practices highlight that where non-state settlement exists alongside formal courts, the core issue is not the existence of community settlement, but the governance of its interface with rights standards, accountability, and consistent recordkeeping. [12]

4.7 Comparative lesson for Nasarawa

The cross-cutting lesson is not that Nasarawa should copy any one model. It is that court-connected settlement programmes tend to be strongest where: (a) the referral basis is clear, (b) participation is voluntary in substance for civil matters, (c) safeguards for vulnerable parties are explicit, (d) settlement outcomes are recorded in enforceable form, and (e) basic metrics exist so the programme can be assessed beyond broad claims. [4] [8] [9]

LEGAL LEGITIMACY: WHY COURT-CONNECTED ADR INITIATIVES OF THIS NATURE ARE PERMISSIBLE

Court-connected ADR programmes are consistent with modern case management and access-to-justice imperatives, provided civil participation is voluntary in substance and procedural rights remain protected.

First, Nigeria’s constitutional and statutory rights framework requires that access to remedies be meaningful in practice. Chronic delay can hollow out fair hearing protections and place disproportionate burdens on those least able to bear extended litigation. [1] [2]

Second, the Multi-Door Courthouse model is a recognised institutional pathway for handling disputes through non-trial mechanisms where appropriate. A court-connected programme that channels suitable disputes into structured settlement processes is therefore not conceptually foreign to the justice system. It is an extension of dispute sorting and case management.

Third, legitimacy depends on safeguards. A court-connected settlement scheme cannot be treated as pressure to settle or as a disposal target. It must be presented and implemented as a fair opportunity for resolution, with enforceable outcomes and clear rights protections.

STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION: WHAT MUST EXIST FOR THE INITIATIVE TO BE CREDIBLE

Because the Sulhu Fortnight is framed as a coordinated programme with defined roles and modalities, its credibility turns on operational clarity. A time-bound intervention should be capable of being described as a pipeline.

6.1 Case identification and screening

Matters suitable for ADR referral should be identified using documented screening criteria. Screening helps prevent the common failure of sending complex or non-settleable disputes into settlement processes, wasting time and weakening confidence.

6.2 Referral and consent

Civil referral to Sulhu must be voluntary in substance. Parties must understand that declining ADR does not attract informal penalties, delay tactics, or procedural disadvantages. This is central to both legitimacy and uptake.

6.3 Settlement documentation and enforceability

If Sulhu yields agreed terms, those terms must be recorded clearly, including obligations, timelines, and consequences for breach. Where the NMDC framework provides a route for adoption or formal recognition of settlement terms, it should be used consistently so that outcomes are legally workable and enforceable. Comparative experience shows that a lack of clarity on legal effect and enforcement is a common failure point. [8]

6.4 Monitoring and reporting

Time-bound initiatives should generate a record: number screened, number referred, number settled, number returned to litigation, and time-to-outcome for referred matters. Without basic reporting, the initiative cannot be evaluated, improved, or defended against scepticism.

INTENDED EFFECTS ON JUSTICE DELIVERY: WHAT THE INITIATIVE IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE

The Sulhu Fortnight is framed as an ADR-forward mechanism intended to improve access to justice, reduce congestion, and support amicable dispute resolution. In practice, such initiatives are designed to yield several intended effects, subject to proper screening, adequate resourcing, and consistent coordination.

7.1 Reduction of case backlog

Concentrated focus on selected matters within a defined period is intended to reduce pending caseload pressure and improve cause list management, particularly for disputes that are settlement-suitable and do not require a full trial.

7.2 Reduced detention risk and correctional decongestion

Where the initiative focuses attention on awaiting-trial matters, accelerated review and case progression are intended to reduce unnecessary detention, especially for minor offences and long-delayed cases. Any such benefit depends on case-file readiness, representation, and lawful bail review processes, not speed alone. [1] [2]

7.3 Improved access to justice

The programme is intended to benefit litigants who lack the resources to sustain prolonged litigation by offering a faster resolution for suitable disputes, reducing financial and emotional burdens.

7.4 Improved confidence in court responsiveness and rights compliance

Credible settlement outcomes and reduced delay are intended to improve public confidence in the judiciary and reinforce compliance with fair hearing and liberty protections. [1] [2]

RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS: THE LINE BETWEEN SETTLEMENT AND PRESSURE

A speed-oriented intervention carries a predictable risk: disposal becomes the target rather than justice. Safeguards must therefore be explicit.

8.1 Voluntariness and informed consent

Participation should be voluntary in substance. Parties should be able to obtain advice where needed, especially where there is a power imbalance. Refusal to settle must not attract an informal penalty or procedural disadvantage.

8.2 Protection of vulnerable parties

Comparative experience in family law settings shows that compulsory or pressured settlement can increase harm where vulnerability is present, and can mask injustice as peace. Screening and exemption safeguards are therefore central, not decorative. [9]

8.3 Settlement quality control

Court-connected settlement outcomes must be legally workable. Vague or incomplete terms increase repeat conflict and undermine confidence.

8.4 Criminal justice caution

Where the initiative intersects with bail review, remand cases, or awaiting-trial issues, speed must not dilute lawful assessment. Liberty-related decisions require proper record review, representation, and compliance with applicable standards. [1] [2]

LIMITATIONS AND RISKS

Even a well-run time-bound initiative cannot, by itself, solve underfunding, understaffing, weak registries, poor service systems, or adjournment culture. Gains achieved within a short window may erode if routine court operations remain slow.

Resource constraints also affect consistency. Increased activity requires staffing, logistics, and coordination. There is a further risk of speed over substance, where rapid disposal compromises fairness or the quality of outcomes. These limitations do not negate the initiative’s value, but they set the boundaries of what it can credibly achieve without broader reform.

CONCLUSION

The Sulhu Fortnight, as framed through the NMDC under the leadership of the Chief Judge, is a court-connected ADR initiative aimed at promoting amicable settlement and reducing congestion within the justice system. Its credibility depends on clear structure, voluntary participation, enforceable settlements, and measurable reporting. Its rights value depends on whether it reduces avoidable delay without compromising fair hearing, liberty safeguards, and the integrity of outcomes, a caution reinforced by comparative experience. [8] [9]

Properly designed and safeguarded, the Sulhu Fortnight can serve as a replicable model for other jurisdictions, not as a complete cure for systemic delay, but as a practical, time-bound component of broader justice sector reform.

About the Authors

Joseph M. Gbagyo, ACIArb (UK), Augusta Shahin, MCIArb (UK) and Oge-Ali Green, ACIArb (UK) are partners at NexusADR LLP, a dispute resolution practice focused on arbitration, mediation, and dispute strategy for commercial and public-sector matters. NexusADR advises businesses, projects, and institutions on dispute prevention, contract and dispute clause design, early case assessment, and effective dispute management. The firm also supports clients through complex negotiations and ADR processes, with a practical emphasis on enforceable outcomes and efficient resolution.

contact.nexusadr@gmail.com

REFERENCE NOTES

[1] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), provisions on fair hearing and personal liberty (insert section numbers in final formatting).

[2] African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, relevant provisions on fair trial, liberty, and effective

[3] Sulhu Fortnight Orientation Meeting (stakeholder orientation), held 30 January 2026 at the High Court Conference Room, convened under the instruction of Hon. Justice Aisha Mohammed Usman (Honourable Chief Judge and Chairman, Governing Council, Nasarawa State Multi-Door Courthouse). NexusADR LLP was represented by two partners in attendance.

[4] United Arab Emirates, Federal Decree-Law No. 40 of 2023 on Mediation and Conciliation in Civil and Commercial Disputes

[5] Pakistan, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017

[6] Pakistan, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, as reproduced in the Asian Development Bank Law and Policy Reform database

[7] UN UPR documentation referencing Egypt’s Law No. 10 of 2004, family courts, and dispute settlement offices

[8] UK government-hosted study on Egyptian family courts and mediation or settlement office practice, including discussion of legal effect and enforcement variability

[9] Scholarly article on mediation in Indonesia’s Religious Courts, including discussion of compulsory mediation and the need for screening and exemptions in sensitive cases

[10] UN Information Service (Vienna) press release on Saudi Arabia’s ratification of the Singapore Convention on Mediation and entry into force dates

[11] Saudi Ministry of Justice communication describing conciliation infrastructure (conciliation centre) and policy direction on amicable settlement

[12] ACCORD analysis on customary mediation in Sudan and the state